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This paper  examines  international  trends  in  plant variety protection,  a  form of intellectual  property 
rights  for  plant varieties  akin  to patents. The  TRIPs  Agreement under the  WTO  has  given a strong 
impetus for the universalisation of plant variety protection regimes with common standards of protection 
across countries. This paper argues that developed and developing countries are likely to adopt widely 
divergent approaches to the development of intellectual property rights for plant varieties. The special 
features of plant variety protection constrain the appropriability of economic returns from protected 
plant varieties. Consequently, in developed countries PVP is being seen as a relatively weak intellectual 
property  right  instrument.  As  stronger  forms  of  protection  for  plant  varieties  become  available,  the 
importance  of  plant  variety  protection  in  developed  countries  may  decline.  Developing  countries 
continue to debate the merits of extending intellectual property rights to agriculture, though they too are 
obliged  under  the  TRIPs  Agreement  to  protect  plant  varieties.  Their  concerns  are  focused  on  the 
“inequities”  inherent  in  a  system  of  plant  breeders’  rights.  Attempts  by  developing  countries  to 
incorporate farmers’ rights provisions in their PVP systems are likely to dilute the incentives for private 
investment in plant breeding.  
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1.  Introduction 
The application of intellectual property rights to new varieties of plants is a relatively recent phenomenon 
in the long history of intellectual property rights (IPRs).  The key objective of plant variety protection 
(PVP),  a  form  of  IPRs  for  plant  variety  innovations,  akin  to  patents
1,  is  to  stimulate  plant  variety 
                                                
1 Two important differences are that PVP generally allows for farmers’ exemption and researchers’ exemption, 
which are not allowed under patents. The former allows farmers to use to seeds of a protected variety saved from 
the harvest for replanting their land in subsequent seasons without payment of royalty to the breeder and the latter 
allows researchers to use a protected variety as an “initial source of variation” in the development of other new 
varieties. PVP protects the new plant variety, but not the underlying genetic resource.  
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innovations (Thiele-Wittig and Claus: 2003).The late emergence of PVP in the IPR arena is probably 
attributable to the nature of institutional arrangements required for the application of IPRs to a self-
reproducing biological innovation. Given the “public good” characteristics
2 of plant variety innovations 
and the difficulties faced by plant breeders in appropriating returns from their innovations, it was the 
public  sector  that  was  dominant  in  plant  breeding  for  a  long  period
3 .  Increasing  private  sector 
participation in plant breeding, initially in the development of hybrid varieties of corn in the US, provided 
the impetus for an IPR framework for plant varieties for encouraging innovation and private investment. 
The emergence of PVP had also to be preceded by paradigm shifts regarding the applicability of IPRs to 
living materials. PVP has become well established in developed countries, but only over the last three 
decades or so.  Till the early 1990s, PVP remained almost exclusively a feature of developed countries
4. 
While  developing  countries  recognised  the  importance  of  variety  improvement  for  agricultural 
productivity growth, they generally relied on research by public sector institutions at the national and 
international level for the development of new varieties
5 (Evenson and Gollin: 2003). PVP or other forms 
of IPRs for plant varieties were not seriously considered as policy options for encouraging plant variety 
innovations. However, international efforts to harmonize IPR regimes across countries following from the 
international trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round have accelerated the spread of PVP systems across 
a whole range of countries. The key economic arguments advanced to developing countries were that (1) 
it would facilitate the transfer of improved (protected) varieties from developed countries (which in the 
absence of protection may not be offered to them at all) and (2) it would provide incentives for private 
investment in plant breeding. With fiscal constraints restricting the growth of public agricultural research 
investment in developing countries (in real terms) (Alston, Pardey and Smith: 1998) private investment 
was  expected  to  become  increasingly  important  for  sustaining  varietal  development.  In  developing 
countries, the development of more productive varieties is an urgent need. The speed with which PVP can 
induce variety innovations and private investment in plant breeding is, therefore, an important issue for 
them. This paper first explores some of the key trends in plant variety protection in developed countries 
over the last three decades. It then examines the emerging scenarios for developing countries as they 
introduce PVP regimes. It argues that although the Agreement on Trade-related aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) under the WTO attempts to universalise IPR regimes for plant varieties, with 
                                                
2 The public good characteristics most specifically relate to the genetic information contained in a plant variety. 
 
3 This is reflected in the role played by Land Grant Universities in the United States and institutions like the Plant 
Breeding Institute and John Innes Institute in the UK in plant breeding since the early 1900s. The public sector still 
plays a key role in plant breeding in both developed and developing countries.  
 
4 Some  countries  like  Argentina  and  Chile  introduced PVP  legislation  quite  early  on.  Argentina  has  had PVP 
legislation since 1978. But its implementation  was seriously taken up  only  much later towards the end  of the 
1980s/early 1990s (Jaffe and Van Wijk: 1995). Argentina became a member of UPOV only in 1994.  
 
5 The collaborations between national public sector institutions and the International Agricultural Research Centres 
of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (e.g., CIMMYT, Mexico and IRRI, Manila) were 
responsible for several spectacular breakthroughs in varietal development such as the “Green Revolution” varieties 
in wheat and rice. The exchange of plant genetic resources under these collaborations was unencumbered by IPRs. 
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common standards of protection across countries, developed and developing countries can be expected to 
take widely divergent approaches to the development of their IPR regimes.    
 
Adoption of PVP  
OECD countries, in particular Western European countries, have been the pioneers
6 in PVP legislation 
under  the  auspices  of  UPOV
7,  an  international  convention  that  seeks  to  harmonize the  standards  of 
protection across member countries. The enforcement of PVP rights in European Union (EU) countries 
has been facilitated by the “Common Catalogue” and the compulsory seed certification system prevalent 
in most countries
8 – and more recently by the Community Plant Variety Office (set up in 1994), which 
grants titles valid in 15 EU countries against a single application.  Figure-1 shows the economic divide 
that characterised the adopters and non-adopters in the early 1990s. PVP was not a feature of economies 
where agriculture had a significant share in output and employment. The fact that PVP involves some 
restrictions on the use of farm-saved seed, a long-standing traditional practice among farmers, suggests 
that there may be significant political constraints to the adoption of PVP till the share of agriculture in 
output and employment declines below a threshold level
9.  
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a part of the WTO 
Agreement, requires all member-countries of the WTO to establish an effective system of plant variety 
protection within  a  specified  time frame.  This has  significantly accelerated the  adoption of PVP  by 
                                                
6 The  United  States  introduced  the  Plant  Patents  Act  in  1930.  However,  the  Act  applied  only  to  asexually 
reproducing  varieties  and  was,  thus,  largely  confined  to  ornamentals  and  some  horticultural  species  in  its 
application. In the first half of the 20
th century, the fact that plants may not reproduce “true to type” was seen as an 
important constraint in extending patents to plant varieties. By confining itself to asexually reproducing varieties, 
the US Plant Patents Act avoided this difficult question. It was the US Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 which 
extended  protection  to  agricultural  and  other  species  based  on  the  criteria  of  “Distinctness,  Uniformity  and 
Stability.” The US Plant Patents Act can be seen a precursor to plant variety protection legislation adopted in 
Western Europe and the US from the 1960s.  
 
7 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Geneva. The Convention, which came into 
being in 1961, underwent major revisions in 1978 and 1991. Harmonisation of procedures and standards reduces the 
transaction costs for breeders in obtaining protection for a variety in a number of different countries.  
 
8 The “Common Catalogue” is a marketing regulation that requires that any variety sold in the European Union be 
inscripted in the European Common Catalogue after being tested for “Distinctness, Uniformity and Stability” (DUS) 
and “Value in Cultivation and Use” (VCU). This regulation along with the system of compulsory seed certification 
makes the unauthorised multiplication of seeds of protected varieties more difficult (Berlan and Lewontin: 1986). 
 
9 This conclusion is actually based on an econometric analysis of adopters and non-adopters. A logistic regression 
model using a constant and a single variable (log of the share of the agricultural labour force in the total labour 
force – LNAGLABF) was able to classify 95% of the pre-1995 adopters and non-adopters of PVP correctly. The 
addition of other variables such as GNP at market price or GNP per capita did not improve the predictive power of 
the model. In the post-1995 (post-TRIPs) situation, LNAGLABF alone was not a good predictor of PVP adoption. 
However, in the post-1995 situation, a logistic model with LNAGLABF, an LADUMMY (representing a Latin 
American country participating in a common trade arrangement) and a COMDUMMY (representing ex-communist 
transition economies) was able to classify 90% of the countries correctly as adopters and non-adopters. 
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developing countries and is reflected in the membership of UPOV, which grew from 27 countries in 1994 
to 50 in 2002. With major agricultural producers like China, India and Brazil adopting PVP legislation, 
PVP countries now account for more than 80% of world agricultural production.  
 













Share of agriculture in GDP (%)
Share of agricultural labour force in total
labour force(%)
Agricultlural yield- Cereal yield in quintals per
hectare
GDP per capita - in PPPs in current
international dollars ('00)
GNP at market prices (constant 1995 billion
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Value added in agriculture (constant 1995
billion US dollars)
Countries that had not introduced PVP prior to 1995
Countries that had introduced PVP prior to 1995
 
Source: Data on PVP adoption from UPOV (2000). Data on other variables from World Development 
Indicators 1999 (World Bank: 1999) 
 
Trends in PVP grants 
Figure-2  shows  the  trends  in  grants  in  UPOV  member-countries  over  the  period  1973-1999.  It  is 
estimated that out of the more than 110,000 certificates issued since the inception of legislation in all 
UPOV member-countries, nearly 57,000 (62.7%) have been issued in the post-1990 period. However, at 
the end of 1999, the total number of grants in force was 47,018, which suggests that a large proportion of 
certificates get surrendered before the full term of protection (17 to 25 years) in different countries. 
While the total number of titles issued has shown a steady upward trend owing to the entry of many new 
countries into UPOV, the number of titles has tended to decline or stagnate after 1995 in EU countries.  
In EU countries, the decline in national titles is possibly attributable to breeders opting for EU-wide 
protection granted by the CPVO. In the US, the number of new applications for PVP certificates has e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
declined  steadily since  1998
10,  although  it is not  clear  whether this  reflects a  long term  trend.  It  is 
probably due to breeders switching to stronger forms of protection like utility patents for plants. The 
decline in PVP applications has been accompanied by a substantial increase in utility patents granted for 
plants, components of plants and associated technological processes (Figure-3). It must be noted that 
genetically modified plants are generally protected by utility patents, rather than by PVP certificates. 
 




















Source: Graph and data provided by UPOV.  
 
The top six countries – United States, Netherlands, France, Germany, United Kingdom and Japan – 
account for nearly 70% of the currently valid grants (Figure-4). This is partly attributable to the fact that 
these six countries are also the countries that have had PVP legislation for the longest duration. The 
figures also include titles granted in the US under the older Plant Patents Act of 1930 for asexually 
reproducing species. In Europe, the use of PVP by breeders is extensive, though it is more pronounced in 
the case of self or open pollinated crops. An analysis of the varieties inscripted in the European Common 
Catalogue  shows  that  82%  of  wheat  varieties,  90%  of  perennial  ryegrass  varieties,  84%  of  potato 
varieties 50% of soybean varieties and 36% of maize varieties are covered by protection. Expectedly, 
protection is less important in the case of crops dominated by hybrids (e.g. maize). Hybrids are not self-




                                                
10 The trend is less clear in the US in relation to the number of certificates issued since 1999. Annual PVP grants in 
the US appear to have steadily declined over the period 1992-1998, reaching a low of just 68 certificates in 1998. 
The numbers have subsequently recovered with a sharp upward (unexplained) spike in 2001. However, given the 



























































































































Titles issued  Titles in force  Number of UPOV member States
1978 Act enters into force
1991 Act enters 
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Patents related to plant technologies include (1) plant organisms, cultivars, germplasm (2) physical 
structure and plant function (3) agronomic applications (4) nutritional characteristics (5) Male sterility / 
self-incompatibility (6) other plant technologies   
Source: Economic Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture. Agricultural 
Biotechnology Intellectual Property Database accessed from 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/biotechpatents/  on 21-3-2004 
 
















Source: Calculated from data contained in UPOV (2001). 
 
The most striking feature of PVP grants in UPOV member countries is the very large proportion of grants 
accruing  to  ornamentals  (Figure-5).  For  all  countries  taken  together,  horticultural  crops  (including 
ornamentals,  fruits  and  vegetables)  account  for  70%  of  grants,  while  ornamentals  alone  account  for 
51.5%. The pattern of dominance of ornamentals extends to a diverse set of countries. As the debate on 
the impact of plant variety protection often focuses on its impact on food security for small and resource 
poor farmers, it is something of a paradox that PVP almost universally evokes the largest response from 
ornamental species. The large share of ornamentals cannot be explained by their share in the commercial 
market for seed/propagating material or their share in the value of crop output. It is partly a reflection of e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
the sheer diversity of ornamental species
11. More importantly, it may reflect the fact that the scope of 
breeders’ rights in the case of ornamentals is significantly different from that in other crops. The absence 
of farmers’ exemption and the ease of detecting infringements in the case of ornamentals increase the 
appropriability of returns from protected varieties.  



















Source: Calculated from data contained in UPOV (2001). Data relate to 30 UPOV member countries for 
which data were available. No data were available for certain UPOV member countries which had joined 
UPOV recently.  
 
Agricultural crops (which include cereals, fodder, oilseeds, beans and fibre) account for only 30% of all 
the PVP grants. Table-1 shows the share of the top ten crops in PVP grants for agricultural species in six 
countries- Australia, France Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States. The table 
also shows the number of other agricultural species for which grants have been made in these countries. 
The top ten crops account for 63-94% of the total grants for agricultural crops. Just four cereal crops 
(wheat,  maize,  barley  and  oats),  two  oilseed  crops  (soybean  and  oilseed  rape),  three  forage  species 
(perennial ryegrass, lucerne and fescue) and two bean/ lentil species (French bean and peas) and one 
tuber  crop  (potato)  account  for  an  extraordinarily  high  percentage  of  grants  for  agricultural  crops. 
Considering the fact that there are nearly 240 agricultural species for which grants have been made in 
different countries, this represents a very high degree of concentration in PVP grants in agricultural crops. 
Thus, even in developed countries that provide a high level of enforcement of breeders’ rights, PVP 
appears  to generate a significant  response  in terms of new  variety development only from the  most 
important agricultural crops. A large number of agricultural crops appear to receive no stimulus for new 
variety development from PVP. From the point of view of developing countries, it is significant that 




                                                
11 For instance, in the Netherlands while PVP grants have been made for 6 species of cereals, they have covered 240 
species of ornamentals.  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
 
Table-1: Share of top ten crops in PVP grants for agricultural crops (%) 
 
Source: Calculated from UPOV (2001). 
 
An  examination  of  the  data  for  UPOV  member-countries  also  reveals  some  interesting  empirical 
regularities in PVP grants. While cumulative grants in any crop keep increasing with time, the valid 
grants  (total  grants  less  expired  or  surrendered  grants)  follow  an  S-shaped  pattern  over  time  (see 
illustrations in Figure-6). The S-shaped time path suggests that valid grants tend to reach a “saturation” 
or “ceiling” level in each crop in mature PVP countries. This pattern appears to be an outcome of three 
factors  (a) the  time  required  for  new variety  development  to respond to  PVP,  given  the  lags  in  the 
breeding process (b) the size of the market, which may set a ceiling on the number of varieties that can 
remain in commercial production, especially if total seed market volumes are fixed (or are changing 
slowly)  (c)  the  gradual  displacement  of  older  “unprotected”  varieties  and  the  diffusion  of  new 
“protected” varieties following an “epidemic” model. The time taken for saturation levels to be reached 
Crop/Country  Australia  France  Germany  Netherlands  UK  USA 
Wheat  13  9  5.9  3.9  14.4  10.8 
Barley  4.3  7  6.5  4.1  19.8  2.5 
Maize    44  17.9  9.9  1.2  15.9 
Sorghum    1.3         
Oats  5.1        4.1   
Rape  7.5  3.3  8.6    11   
Sunflower    12.1         
Soybean    1.4        24.3 
Pea  3.4  4.7  6.1  6.8  6   
French Bean  2.8  5.8  3.8  7.9  4.6  8.3 
Field Bean          2.9   
Potato  10.1  5.8  10  19.9  10.9   
P. Ryegrass  5.5    9.6  20.7  10.7  3.5 
Italian Ryegrass        3.0     
Lucerne  4.5          2.7 
Bluegrass      3.2  4.2    2.1 
Fescue      4.7  5.7    3.1 
Cotton  6.7          8.1 
Total top ten agricultural 
crops  62.9  94.4  76.3  86.1  85.6  81.3 
Others  37.1 (108) 
5.6  
(20)  23.7 (78)  13.9 (25)  14.4 (29)  18.7 (125) 
 
Figures in parentheses indicate the number of other species for which grants made. e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
varies across countries and crops, but in general ranges from 25-35 years. Industrial crops like soybean 
and oilseed rape appear to produce a quicker PVP response than food crops. The full impact of the 




Figure-6: Empirical Regularities in PVP Grants 
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Source: Data on valid PVP certificates extracted from UPOV (2001) and annual publications of PVP 
authorities. Valid PVP certificates for any species in any year = Total number of PVP certificates issued 
since inception of PVP legislation for a species  - PVP certificates expired/surrendered/terminated till that 
year.  
 
Concentration in ownership of PVP grants 
The seed industry in developed countries has undergone a remarkable process of consolidation over the 
last three decades through acquisitions and mergers (Sehgal: 1995, King: 2001) – a process which has 
accelerated significantly with the advent of biotechnology since the mid 1980s (Kalitzandonakes and 
Bjornson: 1997, Hayenga: 1998). This process of consolidation has been driven by the attempts of large 
                                                
12 The implication is that policy makers in developing countries should be careful not to expect an instantaneous or 
rapid private sector response to PVP. 
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chemical and agro-chemical companies to exploit the complementarities between seed and other inputs 
(Butler  and  Marion:  1985)  and  later  by  the  need  to  access  and  control  IPRs  related  to  critical 
biotechnology research tools and processes necessary for genetic modification (Rausser, Scotchmer and 
Simon:  1999,  Graff,  Rausser  and  Small:  2003).  Consolidation  has  resulted  in  fairly  high  levels  of 
concentration in the product market as well as in IPR ownership (“innovation” market). Several measures 
have been designed to measure the degree of concentration in any market –e.g., the 4-firm concentration 
ratio (CR-4), the Lerner Index and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
13.  
 
At the product market level, the seed industry worldwide does not appear to exhibit a high degree of 
concentration. In 1997, the top 10 companies accounted for about 30% of the estimated global seed 
market of US $ 15 billion (RAFI: 1997). The CR-4 ratio was 21% with an HHI of 351 (Goldsmith: 2001). 
In the agrochemicals industry, the top 10 firms accounted for 82% of a global market of US $ 30.5 billion. 
The CR-4 ratio was 41% with an HHI of approximately 743. Therefore, compared to other agricultural 
input  industries,  the  global  seed  market  is  still  relatively  fragmented  (Lebuanec:  1998),  although 
concentration levels at the national level are much higher than at the global level. 
 
There is no empirical evidence to suggest that PVP has contributed significantly to the consolidation of 
the seed industry. This is because conventional PVP provides for farmers’ privilege and researchers’ 
exemption. The latter allows any protected variety to be used as an “initial source of variation” in the 
development of other new varieties. Consequently, PVP has not been seen as creating incentives for 
mergers and acquisitions for the purpose of accessing protected material for further development. PVP 
itself has generally not been seen as having a large impact on the potential for follow-on innovations .The 
contrast is with the agricultural biotechnology industry, where it has been argued that the need to access 
protected biotechnology processes and research tools from diverse IPR holders and the large transaction 
costs  of  negotiating  individual  licenses  may  have  spurred  the  consolidation  of  biotechnology  firms 
through mergers and takeovers. However, as discussed in a later section, in developed countries efforts 
are being made to strengthen PVP (e.g., through the essential derivation clause
14, restrictions on farmers’ 
privilege etc) and provide better appropriability of returns to breeders by bringing PVP closer to patents. 
When these provisions to strengthen PVP are put in place, then the concentration of ownership of PVP 
                                                
13 The 4-firm concentration ratio is the share of the market held by the top four firms in the industry. The Lerner 
Index is an index of market power, which looks at the deviation of industry price from the marginal cost. The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is the sum of the square of the market shares of all the firms in the industry. The 
market shares are squared to give greater weightage to larger firms.  
 
14  The  desire  to  discourage  “cosmetic  breeding”  and  the  need  to  prevent  second  round  innovators  from 
appropriating the returns of first round innovators through relatively minor or unimportant modifications of existing 
varieties,  has  led  to  strengthening  of  PVP  in  the  1991  Convention  of  UPOV.  The  principal  change  is  the 
incorporation of the “Essentially Derived Variety (EDV)” clause in PVP legislation .The effect of the EDV clause is 
to restrict researchers’ exemption and bring PVP much closer to patents (where researchers’ exemption generally 
does not prevail). Thus, it is conceivable that in the future, with vigorous enforcement of the EDV provision, PVP 
may create incentives for consolidation in a manner similar to agricultural biotechnology patents.  
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certificates  may  begin  to  have  important  implications  for  future  innovations  in  plant  breeding.  In 
particular, concentration of PVP ownership may have a significant impact on competition in the seed 
industry  through  its  impact  on  the  “follow-on”  development  of  new  varieties.  The  concentration  of 
ownership of PVP certificates could potentially become an important determinant of market share for 
seed companies.  
Data on concentration of PVP holdings in 30 UPOV member-countries for six crops as at the end of 2000 
and the associated HHI indices are summarised in Table-2. These are crops for which the largest numbers 
of PVP certificates have been issued and are major food/industrial crops grown widely in both developed 
and developing countries.  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
Table-2: Concentration of PVP Certificates in UPOV member-countries (2000) 
CROPS  Wheat  Maize  Soybean  Potato  P. Ryegrass 
Oilseed 
Rape 
Total PVP grants in 
UPOV countries  2600  5382  1503  2650  1650  1923 
Rank of companies 
(in PVP ownership)
                   
1  Monsanto  Pioneer  Monsanto  Coop De ZPC  Cebeco  Svalof 
   258  893  228  223  259  306 
   9.92%  16.59%  15.17%  8.41%  15.70%  15.91% 
2 
  US 
Univs/SAES  Monsanto  Novartis  Agrico  Advanta  Monsanto 
   144  600  206  225  217  301 
   5.53%  11.15%  13.17%  8.49%  13.15%  15.65% 
3  Svalof  Limagrain  Pioneer 
Hettema 
Zonen  DLF 
Deutsche 
Saat 
   113  565  181  159  136  197 
   4.35%  10.50%  12.04%  6.00%  8.24%  10.24% 
4  Benoist  KWS 
US 
Univs/SAES  Saka Ragis  Barenbrug 
Nordeutsch
e 
   112  445  149  113  147  146 
   4.31%  8.27%  9.91%  4.26%  8.90%  7.59% 
5  Advanta  Novartis  Advanta  Germicopa 
Deutsche 
Saat  KWS 
   92  327  52  89  109  89 
   3.54%  6.08%  3.45%  3.36%  6.61%  4.63% 
6  Limagrain  RAGT 
Argentinian 
PSUs*  Boehm 
Dutch 
Institute  Limagrain 
   92  271  44  70  69  89 
   3.54%  5.04%  2.93%  2.64%  4.18%  4.63% 





Wolf  Pure Seeds  Pioneer 
   83  251  43  68  38  81 
   3.19%  4.66%  2.86%  2.56%  2.30%  4.21% 




PSUs*  Nord kartoffel 
Mommer 
steeg  Serasem 
   80  191  30  61  34  75 
   3.08%  3.55%  2.00%  2.30%  2.06%  3.90% 




e  Novartis 
   79  149  29  54  33  63 
   3.04%  2.77%  1.93%  2.03%  2.00%  3.28% 




Pineland  Norika  KWS  Aventis 
   78  147  27  55  33  53 
   3.00%  2.73%  1.80%  2.07%  2.00%  2.76% 
PVP certificates 
held by top ten 
institutions 
1131  3839  989  1117  1075  1400 
Share of top ten 
institutions   43.50%  71.33%  65.80%  42.15%  65.15%  72.80% 
HHI   229  690  686  235  645  754 
*Public sector institutions. 
#Note: Figures in each cell in the table show the name of the company, the number of certificates owned by the 
Company/Group and its percentage share of the total number of certificates in the particular crop. The names 
and location of the headquarters of the companies are given in the appendix. e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
The key patterns that emerge from the data are summarised below: 
 
(a) Concentration in the ownership of PVP certificates is high at the level of individual countries. 
The share of certificates owned by the top ten institutions/firms worldwide for the six crops 
ranges from a little over 40% in wheat and potato to over 70% in the case of oilseed rape and 
maize. The CR-4 ratios are low for wheat (20%) and potato (27%), while they are considerably 
higher for maize (47%), soybean (50%), perennial ryegrass (45%) and oilseed rape (50%). The 
CR-4 ratios tend to suggest that for four out of the six crops considered, concentration levels in 
PVP ownership are moderate to high
15. However, the HHI indices for all crops are well below 
1000, the level beyond which anti-trust concerns would be warranted under US Department of 
Justice guidelines
16. The picture changes significantly when we consider concentration levels in 
individual countries. The data for leading PVP countries
17 is summarised in Table-3. 
Table-3: Concentration in PVP Certificate Ownership at Country Level (2000) 
    USA  UK  France   Germany   Netherlands 
 
CR-4 (%)  67.45  52.85  52.53  25.38  19.58 
CR-10 (%)  89.79  54  73.44  62.09  81.82 
Wheat 
HHI  1658  2509    1042  269  222 
CR-4 (%)  85.09  -  39.19  58.44  60.58 
CR-10 (%)  95.45  -  75.23  85.90  84.12 
Maize 

































￿ -  63.33  52.38  - 
CR-10 (%)  87.01  -  88.89  100 
￿
Soybean 
HHI  1256  -  1162  1201  - 
CR-4 (%)  51.19  33.43  75.86  47.73  72.11 
CR-10 (%)  66.67  63.58  100  85.33  92.76 
Perennial 
ryegrass 




























￿ 943  1470 
CR-4 (%)  66.17  45.55  77.56  64.98  62.85  Oilseed 
rape 
CR-10 (%)  95.59  75.07  94.63  84.81  91.43 
                                                
15 In the industrial organisation literature, a CR-4 ratio of 40-60% in any market is taken to represent moderate to high levels of 
concentration.  
 
16 Under the U.S. Department of Justice guidelines, an HHI of less than 1000 represents a relatively unconcentrated market and 
the Department will not investigate a merger if the HHI is in that range. An HHI between 1000 and 1800 represents a moderately 
concentrated market and the Department would closely investigate the competitive impacts of mergers that would result in an 
HHI in that range. Markets having an HHI greater than 1800 are considered highly concentrated, meriting serious anti-trust 
concerns.  
 
17 Countries that have issued the most PVP certificates.  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
  HHI  1338  685  2132  1596  1257 
Source: Estimated from data contained in UPOV (2001). Concentration was calculated at the level of 
seed company or company group. PVP certificates belonging to subsidiaries, affiliated group companies, 
companies taken over or acquired were treated as belonging to the parent company group.  
 
 
Concentration in PVP ownership is significantly greater at the national level than it is at the 
international level. Though data are presented here for only five countries, it must be noted that 
concentration levels in smaller UPOV countries are even greater (probably because there is less 
competition in smaller markets). In wheat, PVP ownership is concentrated (CR-4> 50%, HHI> 
1000)  in  the  US,  UK  and  France.  The  figures  for  the  US  need  to  be  interpreted  cautiously 
because all US Universities/State Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) have been clubbed 
together  as  a  single  institution.  PVP  ownership  in  maize  is  highly  concentrated  in  the  US, 
Germany and the Netherlands. Concentration levels in France are probably lower because of the 
significant  participation  of  the  public  sector  (INRA)  and  large  co-operatives  in  varietal 
development. Concentration levels in soybean and oilseed rape are high in almost all countries, 
while HHI indices are generally lower for perennial ryegrass.  
 
(b) A very large proportion of grants is held by a limited number of large transnational seed 
companies, viz, Monsanto, Pioneer (Du Pont), Novartis (Syngenta), Advanta, Aventis, Limagrain, 
KWS, and Cebeco. Some French and German cooperatives also have a large number of PVP 
grants. The above eight large transnational companies account for 53% of PVP grants worldwide 
in maize, 43% in soybean, 31% in perennial ryegrass and 35% in oilseed rape, while accounting 
for only 20% of grants in wheat and none in potatoes. The top five positions in several crops are 
occupied by these companies, e.g.,  
(i)  Monsanto in wheat, maize, soybean and oilseed rape. 
(ii)  Pioneer in maize and soybean. 
(iii)  Novartis in maize, soybean, oilseed rape. 
(iv)  Limagrain in maize and oilseed rape. 
(v)  Advanta in wheat, soybean and perennial ryegrass. 
(vi)  KWS in maize and oilseed rape. 
Therefore,  the  concentration  of  ownership  of  PVP  certificates  in  the  hands  of  transnational 
companies cuts across crops. 
 
(c)  The  overall  level  of  concentration  is  less  in  the  case  of  crops  where  public  sector  or 
cooperative institutions have played a substantial role in plant breeding. The public sector has 
traditionally  been  strong  in  breeding  new  varieties  of  self/open-pollinated  crops,  possibly 
because it was expected that the private sector would not be keen to invest in non-hybrid crops. 
In  wheat,  soybean,  perennial  ryegrass  and  potato  (all  non-hybrid  crops)  the  degree  of 
concentration is less than it is in maize and oilseed rape. Maize is a crop currently dominated by e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
hybrids  and  it  is  well  documented  that  in  the  United  States  the  public  sector  has  almost 
completely  withdrawn  from  the  development  of  finished  cultivars  of  maize.  Oilseed  rape  is 
another crop where hybridisation has been relatively successful, allowing the private sector to 
play a major role in the development of new varieties. In the case of potato, the strong presence 
of European cooperatives appears to have prevented concentration of PVP certificates in the 
hands of major transnational seed companies. In general, the participation of public sector and 
cooperative institutions in plant breeding appears to serve as a check on concentration in PVP 
ownership. 
 
(d) Concentration in the ownership of PVP grants has mainly come about through mergers and 
acquisitions,  especially  those  that  have  taken  place  in the  1990s,  rather  than  through  the 
acquisition of a dominant share of new certificates by the major seed companies. Many major 
seed  companies  have  acquired  a  large  part  of  their  PVP  portfolios  through  mergers  and 
acquisitions. The classic case is that of Monsanto, which occupies a leading position in wheat, 
maize, soybean and oilseed rape. 96.5% of its wheat PVP certificates, 76.7% of maize certificates, 
94.2%  of  its  soybean  certificates  and  27%  of  its  oilseed  rape  certificates  have  accrued  to 
Monsanto as a result of acquisitions. In fact prior to the mid-1980s, Monsanto was not primarily 
a  seed  company  at  all;  it  was  mainly  in  the  agro-chemicals  and  pharmaceutical  business. 
Similarly, Dow, which is now estimated to be among the ten largest seed companies in the world, 
acquired its entire maize portfolio through acquisitions. Companies that were originally focussed 
on one set of crops have acquired leading positions in the ownership of PVP certificates of other 
crops through mergers and acquisitions. Limagrain, France, which is now the fourth largest seed 
company in the world, was originally a maize company. Its entire wheat PVP portfolio has been 
acquired  by  taking  over  the  European  operations  of  Nickersons.  Similarly,  KWS,  Germany, 
which is a major maize company owes its entire wheat portfolio to the take over of Cambridge 
Plant Breeders, Twyford, and  Lochow-petkus GmbH, whereas only a small proportion of its 
maize  portfolio  has been  derived through  acquisitions.  Clearly,  it is the  consolidation of the 
global  seed  industry  through  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  has  led  to  a  high  degree  of 
concentration of IPRs for plant varieties.  
 
We do not have the data to examine the empirical relationship between IPR ownership product market 
shares. However, it is likely that ownership of IPRs over plant varieties does translate into commercial 
seed market shares. IPR ownership may be a good leading indicator or predictor of seed market shares.  
 
PVP Impacts 
Though Europe has been the pioneer in PVP legislation, there have been no studies of the economic 
impacts of PVP on European agriculture or research. Most of the empirical studies have focused on the e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
United States and some on Latin America
18. We do not propose to review the literature on empirical 
studies of PVP here. However, the key findings of these empirical studies can be summarised as under: 
 
 
a)  PVP grants (which may be taken as an indicator of innovative activity) in any country vary 
systematically with the size of the market for seeds, the strength of the IPR regime and the size 
of the domestic research system. (Perrin, Kunnings and Ihnen: 1983, Srinivasan: 2001) 
 
b)  PVP has accelerated varietal turnover in several crops (e.g. soybean in the US, providing more 
choice to farmers) but there is little evidence that it has led to any increase in the trend rate of 
yield gain. (Perrin, Kunnings and Ihnen: 1983, Alston and Venner: 1998) 
 
c)  PVP facilitates private sector participation in plant breeding of certain specific non-hybrid crops. 
However, the stimulus of PVP does not extend to a wide range of crops. (Butler and Marion: 
1985, Perrin, Kunnings and Ihnen: 1983, Butler: 1985, Frey: 1996). 
 
d)  The  incentive  effects  of  PVP  for  investment  in  plant  breeding  may  be  fairly  weak  as 
appropriation  of  returns  by  breeders  is  constrained  by  farmers’  and  researchers’  exemption. 
(Butler and Marion: 1985, Butler: 1995, Janis and Kesan: 2002). 
 
e)  PVP does appear to play an important role in facilitating change in the institutional framework 
for plant breeding research. In the context of fiscal constraints, it forces a reappraisal of the role 
of the public sector in plant breeding and its relationship with the private sector. (Butler: 1985, 
Knudson and Pray: 1991) 
 
f)  PVP has not been an important factor contributing to the concentration and consolidation trends 
in the seed industry worldwide
19 (Butler and Marion: 1985, Srinivasan: 2003b). 
 
PVP and appropriability of returns 
The effectiveness of plant variety protection in stimulating innovative effort or research and development 
expenditures for the development of new plant varieties is likely to depend on the extent to which it 
allows plant breeders to benefit from their innovations. Empirical studies suggest that the impact of PVP 
on private R&D expenditures has been rather modest because PVP facilitates only limited appropriability 
of returns for breeders. Butler and Marion (1985) observe from their study of the US PVP Act that the 
PVPA resulted in “modest private and public benefit at modest private and public costs” (p.79). Perrin et 
al (1983) found that the post-PVP period in the US saw increased private investment in the breeding of 
soybean  and  other non-hybrid  crops  –  but  that  this  increase  was  much  smaller  than the  increase  in 
research investment for hybrid crops. In a more recent review of empirical studies of the US PVP Act, 
Janis and Kesan (2002)
20 observe: 
                                                
18 Some relevant studies are Butler and Marion: 1985, Perrin, Kunnings and Ihnen: 1983, Butler: 1985, Kalton and 
Richardson: 1983, Kalton and Richardson: 1989, Frey: 1996, Alston and Venner: 1998, Jaffe and Van Wijk: 1995.   
 
19  However,  patents  and  IPRs  associated  with  biotechnology  innovations  may  well  have  made  a  decisive 
contribution to this trend. 
 
20 This study  has been relied  upon extensively in  UPOV  document WIPO-UPOV/SYM/02/8  dated 3-10-2002 
(UPOV: 2002) e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
 
“However, more recent studies now confirm misgivings about the PVPA’s capacity to provide adequate ex 
ante incentives…. We agree with the assessment that the PVPA does not stimulate R & D spending” 
(p.775). 
“We draw a number of conclusions from these studies. First, the history of plant variety protection regimes 
in the United States and abroad reveals that the role of plant variety protection in the overall intellectual 
property scheme has mutated greatly without any fundamental changes to the general statutory approach to 
plant variety protection. Whereas plant variety protection was initially designed as the primary (or even 
exclusive)  form  of  intellectual  property  protection  for  seed-grown  plants,  the  coming  of  plant 
biotechnology,  and  the  dawning  acceptance  of  utility  patents  for  plants,  has  relegated  plant  variety 
protection to a secondary role. Modest statutory amendments to the PVPA have shown no real promise of 
lifting  the  PVPA  up  from  this  secondary  status.  Second,  our  empirical  assessment  of  licensing  and 
enforcement activities concerning U.S. plant variety protection certificates confirms that the PVPA regime 
as presently constituted plays only a marginal role in stimulating plant breeding research in the United 
States. Our assessment strongly suggests that the PVPA does not provide patent-like ex ante innovation 
and  investment  incentives  and  that  the  PVPA  has  not  generated  substantial  ex  post  licensing  and 
enforcement activity. Instead, its role in the United States appears to be very modest: it may serve as a 
marketing tool…. “(p. 777-778) 
 
If limited appropriability is the problem in stimulating plant variety innovation, then there is a need to 
strengthen the protection offered to breeders under PVP. At the same time, a large part of the resistance 
to the introduction of PVP in developing countries stems from the apprehension that PVP will enable 
breeders to earn larger monopoly rents from the sale of protected varieties to farmers. The appropriation 
of  monopoly  rents  by  breeders  is  also  considered  inequitable  because  breeders’  innovations  are 
dependent  in  large  measure  on  the  plant  genetic  resources  conserved  and  maintained  by  farming 
communities.  Many  developing  countries are,  therefore,  attempting  to limit the returns that breeders 
could appropriate through protection by forcing them to share these benefits with farmers or farming 
communities.    Even  though  developing  countries  may  be  adopting  PVP  legislation  to  fulfil  their 
obligations under the TRIPs Agreement, they still have to address these equity concerns and make a case 
that PVP will increase net social benefits.  
 
Plant variety protection certificates are seldom marketed or traded and hence their private value is usually 
not  observed.  However,  it  is  possible  to  infer  the  value  of  plant  variety  rights  from  the  economic 
responses of PVP certificate holders (Schankerman and Pakes: 1986). In almost all countries with PVP 
legislation, certificate holders must pay an annual renewal fee in order to keep the certificate in force. If it 
is assumed that certificate holders make their renewal decisions based on the value of returns they obtain 
from  the  renewal,  then  the  data  on  renewal  of  PVP  certificates  and  renewal  fee  schedules  contains 
information on the value of PVP rights. Such a renewal model implies that protected plant varieties for 
which protection is more valuable (e.g. because it commands a larger market share) will be protected by 
payment of renewal fees for longer periods of time. 
 
Following Schankerman and Pakes (1986), it is assumed that each cohort of PVP certificates is endowed 
with a distribution of initial returns, which decay deterministically thereafter. The model allows both the 
initial distribution and the decay rate to vary over time. It is assumed that certificate holders choose the e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
lifespan of the certificates so as to maximise the discounted value of net returns (i.e., current returns 
minus renewal fees). Schankerman and Pakes show that, for a given schedule of renewal fees, these 
assumptions imply a sequence of renewal proportions over age for each cohort. The proportion of PVP 
certificates  renewed  in  each  year  depends  on  parameters,  which  determine  the  initial  distribution  of 
returns and the decay rates. Their model estimates a vector of parameters, which makes the renewal 
proportion predicted by the model as close as possible to those actually observed. Once the parameters of 
the distribution of initial returns and the decay rates are estimated, the private value distribution of PVP 
certificates is obtained by simulation.  
 
We present below some estimates
21 of the private value of PVP certificates based on a renewal model for 
three European countries, which have had PVP legislation for more than 20 years
22. The estimates were 
prepared separately for agricultural crops and ornamental crops in France, Germany and the Netherlands 
for a range of cohorts of PVP certificates from 1979-1999. The estimates of the private values of holding 
PVP  certificates for the 1980  and 1989  cohorts in France and the 1989 cohort in Germany and the 
Netherlands are presented for agricultural and ornamental crops in Tables 4 & 5 respectively. 
 
Table-4: Value Distribution of PVP Certificates - Agricultural Crops* 
(All values in constant 1998 U.S. Dollars)             









  7113.24  3708.02  863.76  4521.98 
Minimum  .00  .00  .00  .00 
Maximum 
  720521.31  413864.00  55211.94  187109.45 
Percentile 25  378.18  124.22  .00  243.70 
Percentile 50  1726.19  698.17  156.03  1364.29 
Percentile 75  6028.70  2858.86  732.90  4422.26 
Percentile 95  28079.44  15139.61  3880.55  19305.17 
Percentile 99  89076.82  49844.01  11093.53  45620.16 





                                                
21 Details of the estimation and the schedule of PVP application and renewal fees are available from the author.  
 
22 For details of the renewal model see Schankerman and Pakes (1986). The estimates of the private value of PVP 
certificates are based on Srinivasan (2003a). 
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Table-5: Value Distribution of PVP Certificates - Ornamental Crops* 










  5942.71  3797.88  1863.15  505.60 
Minimum  .00  .00  .00  .00 
Maximum  1170011.03  768484.66  118026.04  23884.90 
Percentile 25  120.34  57.12  33.91  .00 
Percentile 50  794.98  435.30  400.00  94.21 
Percentile 75  3564.38  2156.71  1662.08  492.44 
Percentile 95  22455.89  14494.68  8151.09  2166.29 
Percentile 99  90858.15  59430.69  22374.78  6076.59 
Range  1170011.03  768484.66  118026.04  23884.90 
 
The key feature of the value distribution for both agricultural and ornamental crops is the sharp skewness. 
There is a high concentration of PVP certificates with very limited economic value. For the 1989 cohort 
of  agricultural  crops,  the  median  value  of  a  PVP  certificate  was  only  $698  in  France,  $156  in  the 
Netherlands and $1364 in Germany. For the 1989 cohort of ornamentals, the median value was $435 in 
France, $400 in the Netherlands and just $94 in Germany. There is a sharp rise in the value of PVP 
certificates in the third quantile, but most of the value of PVP certificates is concentrated in the tail of the 
distribution, especially in the top 1%. For agricultural crops, only 1% of the protected varieties were 
worth  more  than  $49,844  in  France,  $11,093  in  the  Netherlands  and  $45,620  in  Germany.  For 
ornamentals just 1% of the protected varieties were worth more than $14,484 in France, $8,151 in the 
Netherlands and $2,166 in Germany. The inescapable conclusion is that the bulk of PVP certificates 
provide only very limited economic returns to breeders
23. For agricultural crops, only 40-60% of PVP 
certificates survive for more than five years and less than 30% survive for more ten years. Only a very 
small fraction of certificates (less than 3%) survive for the full term. The highly skewed distribution of 
private value of PVP rights is consistent with the results of studies of the values of patent rights for 
industrial products
24 (Schankerman and Pakes: 1986, Schankerman: 1998, Taylor and Silberston: 1973). 
Private returns to PVP grants are less than 1% of the agricultural R&D expenditures in these countries.  
 
                                                
23 It must be clarified that these results do not imply that international seed companies do not make large profits on 
the sale of new varieties. The results only suggest that the returns to holding IPRs (that too in the form of PVP and 
not patents) are modest. There are other sources of economic returns in the seed business, e.g. market power.  
 
24 Given that PVP certificates are likely to provide weaker protection than patents, we would expect the private 
values of PVP certificates to be lower than that of patents. This is broadly what we find when we compare the 
private values of PVP certificates in this study with the private values of patents in the Schankerman and Pakes 
(1986) study. However, comparisons of the private values of different IPR instruments are likely to be meaningful 
only when they are made across similar sectors/technology fields. Plant variety innovations constitute a relatively 
homogenous groups of innovations whereas the patents data used in the Schankerman and Pakes (1986) study 
relates to diverse sectors/technology fields.  
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The mean value of private returns appropriated from ornamental varieties was greater or nearly the same 
as that appropriated from agricultural crop varieties, even though the volume of seed sales of ornamentals 
is  only  a  fraction  of  that  for  agricultural  crops.  This  surprising  result  underlines  the  difference  in 
appropriability between ornamentals and agricultural crops. 
 
The private values of PVP certificates estimated above do appear to be rather low. However, it must be 
remembered that what renewal models estimate are the “pure” returns to IPRs and do not reflect the 
entire  returns  from  the  development  and  marketing  of  a  new  variety.  The  following  arguments  are 
relevant in this context: 
 
(1) The low average private value of IPR holdings and the highly skewed distribution of private 
value are not unusual in the literature and are not unique to PVP certificates. A large number of 
studies  on  the  private  value  of  patent  rights  (a  much  stronger  form  of  IPR  protection)  for 
different sectors of the economy have found very similar results. (Schankerman and Pakes: 1986, 
Schankerman: 1998) 
 
(2) IPRs  are  only  one  way  of  protecting  an  innovation.  Several  other  methods  of  protecting  an 
innovation  are  available  (e.g.,  trade  secrets,  first-mover  advantage  etc)  which 
inventors/businesses  can  and  do  use.  The  returns  to  IPRs  estimated  using  renewal  models 
measure only the incremental private value that accrues to an inventor owing to IPR protection. 
Returns to IPR protection have empirically been shown to form a relatively small percentage of 
the total returns from inventive activity (Schankerman and Pakes: 1986, Schankerman: 1998).  
 
(3) An important reason for the low estimated private values of PVP certificates is that IPRs alone 
are not sufficient for capturing value from plant variety innovations. IPRs need to be combined 
efficiently with other complementary assets to capture value. There is significant evidence of 
market  power  in  the  seed  industry  and  all  the  market  power  is  not  attributable  to  variety 
ownership. Large profits of seed firms are consistent with low private values of IPR holdings.     
 
With respect to point (3) above, it has been well recognised in the literature that IPRs by themselves do 
not ensure the capture of value (Rausser, Scotchmer and Simon: 1999, Teece: 1987). In order for the 
innovator to appropriate returns from his/her innovations, IPRs have to be combined with a range of 
complementary assets
25. In the case of innovations in plant breeding, the key complementary asset is a 
marketing  and  distribution  network  that  can  reach  the  innovation  to  farmers.  A  relatively  weak 
appropriability regime and the existence of market power in the ownership of complementary assets may 
mean that the incremental returns appropriated by the innovator on account of IPRs are low. A large part 
of the returns from an innovation may accrue to the owners of the complementary assets. The limited 
appropriability of returns from PVP also implies that farmers’ rights provisions being designed by some 
developing countries are unlikely to yield significant economic returns to farming communities.  
                                                
25 Complementary assets are assets with which the innovation must be combined in order to make the innovation 
useful and valuable to the consumer. Teece (1987) distinguishes between three types of complementary assets. 
“Generic  assets”  are  general-purpose  assets  that  do  not  need  to  be  tailored  to  the  innovation  in  question. 
“Specialised assets” are those with unilateral dependence between the innovation and the complementary asset. 
“Co-specialised assets” are those with bilateral dependence.  
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Efforts to strengthen PVP 
The limited appropriability of returns from PVP has led to efforts to strengthen PVP law and bring it 
closer to patents. Some of these efforts are reflected in the changes made to the UPOV Convention in the 
1991 revision.
26 The key changes in relation to the 1978 UPOV Convention are (1) Mandatory extension 
of protection to all species of plants within a specified time frame, as against coverage of a prescribed 
minimum number of species (2) Increase in the minimum duration of protection to 25 years for trees and 
vines and 20 years for other plants (3) Extension of breeder’s right to all production and reproduction of a 
protected variety, as against “production and reproduction for the purpose of commercial marketing.” 
Farmers’ privilege to use seeds of a protected a protected variety saved from the harvest for replanting 
can, however, be provided as an exception to breeders’ rights (4) Extension of the right of the breeder to 
the  harvested  material  in  cases  where  he/she  has  not  had  an  opportunity  to  exercise  rights  over 
propagating  material  of  the  protected  variety  (5)  Introduction  of  the  essential  derivation  clause  to 
discourage “cosmetic breeding.” The essential derivation clause seeks to prevent other breeders from 
appropriating returns from a protected variety through minor (agronomically unimportant) modifications 
(see Box-1). 
 
Box 1: Essentially Derived Varieties 
“Essential Derivation” clauses have been introduced in the PVP legislation of countries that are signatories to the 
UPOV 1991 Convention. The principle of essential derivation in UPOV 1991 was stated as follows: 
A variety shall be deemed to be essentially derived from another variety (“the initial variety”) when 
(1)  It is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a variety that is itself predominantly 
derived from the initial variety, while retaining the expression of the essential characteristics that 
result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the initial variety. 
(2)  It is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety and  
(3)  Except for differences, which result from the act of derivation, it conforms to the initial variety in 
the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of 
genotypes of the initial variety. [Article 14 (5) (b)] (UPOV: 1994) 
The economic principle behind this clause is that when an innovation has spillover benefits for other innovations- for 
example, it could reduce their cost or provide a necessary foundation-then from a social perspective, the first innovator 
should share in profit from subsequent innovations. Otherwise the earlier innovator will have deficient incentives to 
invest. The second innovator will be induced to share his profits with the first innovator only if the second round 
innovation (a new variety) infringes the rights of the first innovator. The objective behind the essential derivation clause 
is to define a set of circumstances in which such an infringement will be deemed to have occurred. However, if the later 
innovator knows that he would infringe a prior PVP right, he may be dissuaded from investing by the threat of ex-post 
hold up for high licensing fees. This hazard might stifle second-generation products or reduce incentives for follow-on 
development of new varieties (Scotchmer: 1991). 
 
The above attempts to strengthen PVP are mainly intended to improve the appropriability of returns, 
which  are  generally  constrained  by  farmers’  privilege  and  researchers’  exemption.  The  essentially 
derived variety (EDV) clause attempts to strike a balance between breeders of protected varieties and 
those who wish to introduce new varieties that are based entirely on the genetic structure of protected 
                                                
26 These changes will get reflected in national PVP legislation as more countries accede to the UPOV Convention of 
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varieties. The precise technical definition of essential derivation is still a contentious issue and as yet 
there is very little experience of enforcement of the provision even in developed countries. However, the 
EDV provision could have significant implications for future innovation in plant breeding, where almost 
all new varieties are based on pre-existing varieties. It has been argued that a very broad interpretation of 
the EDV provision could simply stifle the development of new varieties based on protected varieties 
(Scotchmer: 1991). 
 
The quest for stronger protection has led to plant varieties being protected through patents. In the U.S., 
plant varieties became patentable as a result of a series of judicial decisions reinterpreting the existing 
patent laws The US Supreme Court decision in Diamond vs. Chakrabarty was a land mark case. This 
trend has  been  reinforced by  decisions  of the  United States  Patents and Trademark  Office (ExParte 
Hibberd and ExParte Allen are two important cases) (Goss: 1996). Patents provide stronger protection 
because  they  are  not  subject  to  farmers'   privilege  and  researchers'   exemptions.  The  scope  of  utility 
patents is wide because it allows a breeder to exclude others from making, using or selling the seeds of 
the patented variety. Patent protection is expensive to obtain. A breeder must prove several elements (1) 
that the variety is novel and useful (2) that it is "enabled" (currently this requirement can be satisfied by a 
deposit of the seeds of the variety in the U.S.) and that (3) it is not an obvious improvement upon an 
earlier protected variety. On account of the difficulty of proving that these requirements have been met, 
patents  are  frequently  more  difficult  to  obtain  and  take  longer  to  obtain  than  PVP  certificates. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, in the U.S. during the last few years there has been a decline in the 
number of applications for PVP certificates, while utility patents for plants have maintained a rising trend. 
 
In the U.S., seed companies have also devised a number of contractual arrangements (e.g., purchase 
contracts,  label  notices  etc.)  to  prevent  farmers  from  reusing  the  seeds  of  protected  varieties.  The 
emergence  of  “terminator  technology” 
27can  be  seen  as  a  technological  solution  to  the  problem  of 
enforcing  IPRs  over  a  self-reproducing  innovation.  While  the  concept  of  terminator  seeds  has  been 
deeply  unpopular with  developing  countries (because  of  its  implications for farmers’ livelihoods), it 
nevertheless  brings  into  sharp  focus  the  limited  degree  of  appropriability  afforded  by  current  PVP 
regimes.  
 
PVP and transferability of varieties 
One of the key arguments advanced to developing countries for the introduction of PVP has been that it 
facilitates the transfer of superior varieties bred in developed countries. It was argued that that in the 
absence of IPRs, superior varieties bred in the developed world (increasingly proprietary or protected 
varieties developed in the private sector) would not be offered to them at all, given the fear that any 
                                                
27 “Terminator technology” refers to technology which renders farm-saved seed sterile and, hence, unsuitable for 
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competitor could freely replicate and sell these varieties. Complaints by large seed companies in the 
developed  world  regarding  loss  of  sales  due  to  “piracy”  and  the  “transfer  of  technology”  argument 
underpinned the inclusion of PVP in the TRIPs Agreement. Both these arguments implicitly assume that 
plant varieties protected in one country have large potential markets in several other countries. This 
requires that plant varieties be transferable across a range of countries/agro-climatic environments. The 
economic literature on plant varieties, on the other hand, has tended to emphasise that plant varieties are 
highly  location  specific  in  their  agronomic  performance  and  varieties  developed  for  one 
microenvironment  are  unlikely  to  perform  well  in  other  microenvironments  (Evenson:  1994).  The 
location specificity of varieties mainly arises from two factors (a) adaptation to agro-climatic conditions 
and (b) adaptation to local pests and pathogens. The successful transfer of a variety bred for one location 
to  another  requires  that  the  two  locations  should  have  similar  agro-climatic  conditions  and  that  the 
variety must also be adapted to the biotic and abiotic stresses in the new location. Transferability of 
varieties  also  varies  considerably  by  crop.    The  influence  of  PVP  on  transferability  of  varieties  is, 
therefore, essentially an empirical question.  
 
A useful indicator of the impact of PVP on inter-country movement of varieties is the multi-country 
incidence of protection. Plant variety rights obtained under PVP legislation are national in scope, i.e. 
rights granted in one country are independent of rights granted in any other country. When a breeder in 
country i decides to protect his variety by getting a PVP certificate in country i, he/she has also the option 
of obtaining (for a cost) a PVP certificate in country j. Decisions regarding the exercise of this option are 
informative regarding direct international spillovers between country i and j. Data on the multi-country 
incidence of protection for some important crops are given in the Table-6 below. 
 
Figure-6: Empirical Regularities in PVP Grants 
Germany
Valid PVPCs in Wheat
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United States
Valid PVPCs in Maize
YEAR


































Source: Data on valid PVP certificates extracted from UPOV (2001) and annual publications of 
PVP authorities. Valid PVP certificates for any species in any year = Total number of PVP 
certificates issued since inception of PVP legislation for a species  - PVP certificates 
expired/surrendered/terminated till that year.  
 
 
Even the figures in the table above overstate the extent of inter-country movement of varieties because 
90% of it is accounted for by the intra-European flow of varieties
28. When UPOV member-countries are 
grouped into regions – Asia, Australia, Africa, Europe, North America and South America – and the data 
on multi-country incidence of protection is recast on a regional basis, then it is seen that less than 3% of 
varieties move across regions. PVP-induced movement of varieties is, therefore, very limited.  
 
The foregoing is not intended to suggest that transfers of all plant genetic resources between countries are 
limited. It only suggests that the movement of finished plant varieties, which are the only elements of 
plant genetic resources currently subject to IPRs, is limited. Extensive transfers of germplasm, breeding 
lines  and  even  landraces  take  place  between  public  sector  institutions  in  different  countries  and 
international  public  research  institutions
29,  which  probably  dwarf  the  transfers  of  finished  varieties 
facilitated by PVP
30 (Evenson and Gollin: 2003, Fowler, Smale and Gaijy: 2001). 
                                                
28 As already noted, this intra-European flow is facilitated by the “common catalogue” and the seed certification 
system. 
  
29 The reference here is to the institutions of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
like CIMMYT, Mexico and  IRRI, Manila etc.  
 
30 Plant genetic resources (PGR) for agriculture include not only the “finished” products of plant breeding, but also 
“primitive cultivars, landraces, wild and weedy relatives” (Sedjo: 1988), breeding lines and germplasm in gene 
banks. Of these, only finished plant varieties are currently subject to IPRs.  The international exchange of other 
elements of plant genetic resources (not currently subject to IPRs) has been dominated by exchanges between 
national  and  international  public  sector  institutions  (mainly  between  National  Agricultural  Research  Systems 
(NARS) and CGIAR
30 institutions). The exchange of these resources in the future is likely to depend on the nature 
of emerging institutional arrangements governing such exchanges. Till quite recently, PGR were regarded as a 
“common heritage of mankind” (FAO: 1983) – i.e., as a public good to be freely exchanged between countries. 
However, this concept has undergone a significant change in recent years owing to the actions of both developed 
and developing countries. As developed countries have increasingly applied IPRs to finished products of plant e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
 
A related issue pertains to the incentives created by PVP for foreign participation in domestic plant 
breeding research. The transfer of "finished" plant varieties, advanced breeding lines, germplasm and 
breeding technologies can come about as a consequence of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the seeds 
sector or through technical collaboration agreements between domestic and foreign firms. In the absence 
of an IPR regime that allows sufficient appropriability of returns from new varieties, foreign participation 
in domestic plant breeding may be discouraged. Analysis of WIPO/UPOV data on PVP grants made to 
nationals and foreigners in UPOV countries shows that over the period 1975-1997 nearly 37% of grants 
were made to foreigners and this proportion has increased over time. The proportion of grants made to 
foreigners in selected developed countries and in developing countries is shown in Figure 7. Though the 
direct  transfer  of  varieties  across  countries  is  limited,  PVP  does  elicit  a  significant  response  from 
foreigners  seeking  to  get  their  varieties  protected.  This  suggests  that  transfer  of  plant  material  and 
germplasm as  an adjunct  to  foreign  participation in  the domestic seed  industry is  a more  important 
mechanism for transfer of technology. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
breeding,  developing  countries  have  come  to  feel  that  the  system  of  free  international  exchange  of  PGR  is 
inequitable because it provides no rewards for the PGR that they have conserved and make available to developed 
countries
30. Drawing inspiration from the Convention on Biological Diversity which recognises “sovereign rights” 
of countries over their biological resources and encourages them to ensure “equitable benefit sharing” in their 
exchange and use, developing countries have responded by attempting to enact access legislation to derive rents 
from the ownership of PGR. Falcon and Fowler (2002) argue that most access legislation is “laden with restrictions 
to access, designed more to prevent abuse than to  maximise  benefits” (p. 209). They  also argue that the new 
institutional  arrangements  emerging  at  the  national  and  international  level  are  likely  to  seriously  constrain 
international  exchange  and  restrict  access  to  PGR  for  crop  improvement,  especially  for  developing  countries. 
Therefore, a more restricted regime of international exchange of plant genetic resources does appear to be emerging. 
While PVP presently applies only to finished products of plant breeding, in the emerging scenario IPR-mediated 
exchanges of PGR may become more important. 
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Figure-7: Share of Foreigners in PVP Grants (1975-1999) 
[%]










Source: WIPO (1975-2000). 
 
Public sector and PVP  
The response of public sector research institutions to PVP has always been a matter of considerable 
interest in countries where the public sector has been dominant in plant breeding.  With government 
funding for the public research system declining in most countries (Alston, Pardey and Smith: 1998), 
IPRs could be seen as a source of revenue and public sector institutions may choose to actively protect 
their new  varieties. However, given  their mandate for the wide  and  extensive dissemination of new 
technologies and varieties, these institutions could also choose not to protect their varieties. Clearly, there 
could be conflict between the revenue generation and diffusion objectives. PVP could also lead to a 
redefinition of the role of the public sector in commercial cultivar development. It has been argued that 
with  PVP  providing  incentives  for  private  investment  in  plant  breeding,  the  public  sector  should 
withdraw  from  commercial cultivar  development (a  “near-market”  activity)  to  avoid “crowding  out” 
private investment. At the same time, from the point of view of the public sector, the visibility and 
apparent commercial utility of cultivar development may be more useful in securing government funding 
compared to the results of basic research that may be less well understood.  
 
We examine data on the share of the public sector in PVP certificates for three countries – Australia, 
France and the United States- where traditionally the public sector has played an important role in plant 
breeding (Table-7). In the United States, after some initial hesitation, the State Agricultural Experiment 
Stations and land grant Universities have shown the same propensity to protect their varieties as the 
private sector. In general the share of the public sector in PVP certificates has tended to decline for self 
and open-pollinated crops (except in the case of wheat), though the extent of the decline varies. Even 20-
25 years after the introduction of PVP, the public sector continues to be a significant player in new e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
variety development in these crops. The public sector, however, does tend to get virtually eliminated 
from new cultivar development in crops where hybrids are dominant (e.g. maize). PVP has not been a 
major  source  of  revenue  for  plant  breeding  research  in  public  sector  institutions  and  there  is  little 
evidence that PVP has affected the research priorities of these institutions in a significant way (Knudson 
and Pray: 1991). There is some evidence that PVP has tended to restrict germplasm exchange between 
the public and private sectors (Falcon and Fowler: 2002, Price: 2000)  
 
Table-7: Public Sector Share of PVP Certificates (%) 
Australia 
 
1990  1995  2000 
Wheat  100  100  93 
Barley  50  44  68 
Oats   100  85  95 
Soybean  40  50  38 
Canola  66  75  83 
Cotton  100  88  60 
Potato  50  33  26 
P. Ryegrass  50  22  26 
France 
 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Wheat   20  13  18  21  18  16 
Durum Wheat  -  39  36  32  33  34 
Barley  22  14  15  12  9  8 
Oats  44  33  23  17  13  11 
Maize  83  51  34  25  24  21 
Soybean  -  25  20  20  16  14 
Rapeseed  -  29  15  8  3  3 
Potato  3  5  6  7  10  11 
Flax  40  67  56  54  55  60 
Fodder Sorghum  -  -  33  23  35  35 
United States  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000 
Wheat  29  31  28  31  33  35 
Maize  -  16  18  4  1.7  1.8 
Soybean  48  37  28  24  26  25 
Oilseed rape  -  -  22  33  27  24 
Cotton  8  13  13  13  12  11 
P.Ryegrass  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Alfalfa  -  -  29  21  17  16 
Source: Estimated from data contained in UPOV (2001). Public sector consists of public research 
institutions, public R&D companies (e.g., in Australia), and agricultural universities (e.g., Land Grant 
universities and State Agricultural Experiment Stations in the US). For public sector institutions, which 
have been privatised (e.g., Plant Breeding Institute in the UK) the ownership of PVP certificates has been 
classified as public or private depending on the status of the institution on the date of grant. 
Emerging Scenarios for Developing Countries  
The provisions of the TRIPs Agreement represent an effort to universalise PVP regimes with common 
standards  of  protection  across  countries.  However,  in  analysing  international  trends  in  PVP,  it  is 
important to note the sharp divergence in the perspectives of developed and developing countries on PVP. 
In developed countries, where PVP has been well established for nearly three decades, the focus has been e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
on  the  appropriability  of  economic  returns  permitted  by  PVP.  Farmers’  privilege  and  researchers’ 
exemption,  which  are  important  provisions  built  into  PVP  legislation,  are  seen  as  constraining  the 
appropriation of economic returns by breeders and reducing private incentives to invest in plant breeding. 
Consequently, as discussed earlier in the paper, developed countries have attempted to strengthen PVP 
law and move towards stronger forms of protection that improve appropriability but may curtail farmers’ 
privilege  and  researchers’  exemptions.  This  trend  toward  stronger  forms  of  protection  has  been 
reinforced by the increasing importance of biotechnology based innovations in plant breeding, which are 
protected by patents. In fact, in developed countries, it should not be surprising if conventional PVP 
systems decline in importance and are replaced by stronger IPR regimes flowing from legislative changes 
or (more likely) judicial reinterpretation of existing IPR law.  
 
 By contrast, in most developing countries, the TRIPs obligation has led to a divisive debate about the 
fundamental  desirability  of  extending  IPRs  to  agriculture  and  their  potential  economic  impacts. 
Developing countries have been concerned about the “inequities” inherent in a system of plant breeders’ 
rights. A key concern has been that while plant variety protection (PVP) systems reward plant breeders’ 
for their innovations, they provide no rewards to farmers or farming communities that have conserved 
and  enhanced  agro-biodiversity  over  generations  –  the  very  biodiversity  that  constitutes  the  critical 
resource base for plant breeders. To address this imbalance, many developing countries are attempting to 
incorporate  farmers’  rights  provisions  in  their  PVP  legislation  with  the  objective  rewarding 
farmers/farming communities for their role as conservers of biodiversity (Srinivasan: 2003a). Drawing 
inspiration  from  the  Convention  on  Biological  Diversity,  which  encourages  countries  to  assert  their 
“sovereign  rights”  over  biological  resources,  many  developing  countries  are  also  enacting  access 
legislation  in  an  attempt  to  garner  rents  from  the  plant  genetic  resources  that  they  provide  to  the 
developed countries (GRAIN:2002).  In developing countries, the impact of farmers’ rights provisions 
and access legislation may well be to limit appropriation of returns by institutional plant breeders thereby 
reducing private incentives to invest.  
 
We have noted earlier that the key economic arguments advanced to developing countries for adoption of 
PVP systems were that if would facilitate transfer of improved varieties from abroad and also provide 
incentives for private investment in plant breeding. The data examined in this paper shows that PVP-
induced transfers of “finished” plant varieties have  generally been too small (even across developed 
countries that provide high standards of enforcement) to be significant. While this may be reflecting only 
the location-specificity of plant varieties – it also suggests that there may be simply no large stocks of 
plant variety innovations in developed countries for developing countries to borrow or access. Moreover, 
the incentives for private investment in plant breeding are likely to be diminished not only by developing 
countries’ attempts to address “equity” issues but also by their limited capacity to administer and enforce 
IPRs effectively. Therefore, it would be unrealistic for developing countries to expect large IPR-induced 
flows of private investment in plant breeding.  e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
 
However, it must be noted that even in the absence of IPRs for plant varieties, developing countries (e.g. 
India, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina) that have opened up to foreign direct investment in the seeds sector 
have witnessed a significant restructuring of the domestic seed industry in a relatively short span of time. 
For  a  number  of  strategic  and  economic  reasons  (Srinivasan:  2003b,  Morris:  1998),  foreign  direct 
investment in the seeds sector has proceeded through acquisition of domestic seed companies by seed 
MNCs creating significant levels of market concentration in market for hybrid seed varieties of important 
crops. In developing economies open to foreign direct investment, direct control of seed multiplication 
and distribution by foreign firms may provide a substitute for IPRs. In the case of genetically modified 
varieties (for which no IPR protection is currently available in most developing countries), it has been 
documented (Pray, Bengali and Ramaswami: 2004) that MNCs are attempting to use the relatively slow 
regulatory and approval processes in developing countries as a means of protecting their innovations 
against competition. The key implication is that incentives for private investment in plant breeding in 
developing countries are likely to be determined by the openness to foreign direct investment, potential 
market power, the degree of control that can be exercised over seed supply chains and the ability to 
influence the (non-IPR) regulatory environment, rather than by a system of weakly enforced IPRs.  
 
A  PVP  regime  is  unlikely  to  provide  a  significant  stimulus  by  itself  to  private  investment  in  plant 
breeding or to the transfer of varieties from abroad. This is likely to be particularly true for small/poor 
developing countries with limited commercial markets for seed. These countries may have to continue to 
rely on public sector research institutions – both national and international – for variety development for 
their farmers. Improved varieties, particularly those aimed at resource poor farmers, may turn out to be a 
genuine ‘public’ good.  
 
Many  developing  countries  like  China,  India  and  Brazil  have  built  up  large  National  Agricultural 
Research Systems (NARS) with an impressive record of variety development. The “Green Revolution” 
varieties developed for South Asia and Latin America resulted from fruitful collaboration between the 
NARS and CGIAR institutions (Evenson and Gollin: 2003 ). The future role of NARS in these countries 
will depend not only on the level of funding support provided to them, but also on mandate given to 
public research institutions in the post-PVP situation. If NARS institutions are mandated to generate 
revenue through IPR/PVP protection of new varieties, then the public sector could potentially be faced 
with a conflict of objectives. Generation of revenue through protection of innovations (possibly coupled 
with exclusive licensing) is likely to conflict with the objective of the widest possible dissemination of 
new varieties. The success of large NARS has also depended on free and unrestricted access-national and 
international- to plant genetic resources critical for plant breeding. Access to international plant genetic 
resources has been greatly facilitated (Fowler, Smale and Gaijy: 2001) by the flow of material between 
NARS and the gene banks of CGIAR institutions unencumbered by IPRs. This access to material in the e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
gene banks of CGIAR, which developing country NARS have enjoyed, will probably continue, enabling 
them to pursue variety development through conventional plant breeding. But if, as feared by a number 
of analysts (e.g., Falcon and Fowler: 2002 )  the spread of IPR regimes coupled with the use of access 
legislation by developing countries, leads to a more restrictive international regime of exchange of plant 
genetic resources, then the ability of NARS to produce new varieties could be hampered. Interestingly, 
the  ability of NARS to access  plant genetic resources  at the national  level  could be constrained  by 
farmers’ rights provisions in PVP legislation or benefit-sharing provisions in access legislation. More 
importantly, with the increasing use of biotechnology in plant breeding, the ability of the public sector to 
innovate may be constrained by the lack of access to biotechnology research tools and processes (and 
even genomic information) which are largely in private hands in the developed world. The transaction 
costs and time of negotiating access to protected biotech research tools and processes owned by a number 
of different companies could be considerable.  
 
International  research  institutions  of  the  CGIAR  could  continue  to  be  a  source  of  innovation  for 
developing counties in general and for the poorer countries in particular. But it must be noted that two 
key factors will affect their ability to produce new varieties and disseminate them widely in developing 
countries.  We  have  alluded  to  the  possible  emergence  of  a  more  restricted  international  regime  for 
exchange of plant genetic resources. There is already some evidence that with the spread of IPR regimes 
and access legislation, the flow of accessions to the gene banks of the CGIAR has declined (Falcon and 
Fowler: 2002). The CGIAR institutions too need to access IPR-protected biotechnology research tools 
and processes for the development of new varieties that can compete with the varieties developed by the 
private sector. These institutions are probably in a much better position to negotiate access to protected 
technologies than the NARS, but their research efforts too could be constrained by the difficulties and 
transaction costs of procuring access. This is reflected in the fact that CGIAR institutions have so far 
played  a  minor  role  in  the  development  of  genetically  modified  varieties.  The  challenge  for  the 
international research institutions in the public sector is to devise institutional and legal arrangements 
which will allow them to use proprietary technologies in the development of new varieties, which they 
should then be able to disseminate freely in developing countries. 
 
Attempts by developing countries to address the “equity” issues through farmers’ rights provisions and 
access legislation are unlikely to be very successful in the near term. Farmers’ rights provisions attempt 
to compel breeders to share a portion of their returns from protection with farmers/farming communities 
that have provided the plant genetic resources used by breeders.  The limited appropriability of returns 
allowed by PVP systems implies that the returns to be shared with farmers may not be large. Even 
obtaining  a  share  of  the  limited  returns  is  rendered  difficult  by  the  administrative  and  scientific 
complexity of implementing these provisions. These complexities involve tracing the origin of specific 
plant  genetic resources to individual farming  communities, identifying  the  contribution of a specific 
resource to the development of a new variety, deciding on benefit-sharing norms when new varieties e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
have complex pedigrees with contributions from a large number of existing varieties and deciding how 
far back in time to go in recognising the conservation role of farmers. Similarly, access legislation will 
yield  little  unless  developing  countries  acquire  the  ability  to  develop  comprehensive  inventories  of 
“native” plant genetic resources relevant for plant breeding, establish “ownership” or proof of origin, 
estimate the potential economic or market values of a diverse set of resources, regulate the exchange of 
these resources through material transfer agreements (MTAs), monitor the use of material as it flows 
through a maze of national and international transactions and enforce MTAs in an international context 
through  legal  systems  of  other  countries.  Therefore,  developing  countries  are  unlikely  to  secure 
significant economic returns from access legislation, not because the underlying principles are flawed, 
but because these countries have not yet built up the enormous scientific, technical and administrative 
capacities  required  to  meaningfully  implement  its  provisions.  At  the  same  time,  efforts  to  address 
“equity” issues can reduce incentives for institutional plant breeders and restrict international exchange 
of plant genetic resources, which has hitherto been very useful for development of new varieties. This is 
the fundamental dilemma that developing countries face.  
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, negotiated under the 
auspices of the FAO, addresses some of the concerns regarding the emergence of a more restrictive 
regime of international exchange of plant genetic resources as a result of the expansion of IPR laws and 
legislation relating to biodiversity conservation and exchange in developed and developing countries. 
The Treaty seeks to promote the conservation and sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture  and  the  fair  and  equitable  sharing  of  benefits  from  their  use.  It  seeks  to  achieve  these 
objectives by establishing an “efficient, effective and transparent” multilateral system to facilitate access 
to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture – especially for the most important agricultural crops 
and  a  number  of  important  forages.  However,  while  the  Treaty  has  come  into  effect,  the  detailed 
mechanisms  for  the  proposed  multilateral  system  of  access  and  benefit  sharing  through  appropriate 
“Material Transfer Agreements” are yet to emerge. Compliance mechanisms also have to be developed. 
The  implementation  of  the  Treaty  is  dependent  on  individual  countries  developing  legislation  and 
regulations to implement the Treaty. The challenge for many developing countries is to devise legislation 
that will be consistent with, and complementary to, the emerging IPR/PVP regime and legislation giving 
effect to the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity. However, application of the Treaty’s 
framework  for  equitable  use  and  benefit  sharing  at  the  national  level  can  provide  a  basis  for  the 
implementation  of  Farmers’  Rights. The  administrative  and scientific difficulties  associated with  the 
implementation of Farmers’ Rights are nevertheless likely to remain formidable in the near future.  
  
Conclusions 
Plant  variety  protection  has  become  established  as  an  instrument  of  protection  of  plant  variety 
innovations in developed countries over the last thirty years, even as developing countries continue to e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
debate the merits of a system of IPRs for plant varieties. The TRIPs Agreement has given a strong 
impetus for the universalisation of PVP regimes. But the experience of developed countries with PVP 
and the current concerns of developing countries suggest that developed and developing countries are 
likely to take widely divergent approaches to the further development of IPR regimes. In developed 
countries, as stronger forms of protection become available and the role of protected biotechnological 
processes in plant breeding becomes more important, PVP is likely to be displaced as the instrument of 
protection favoured by breeders. Developing countries are likely to find that PVP provides at best only a 
very modest stimulus to private investment in plant breeding or for transfer of varieties, even as it raises 
troubling equity issues. In attempting to address these equity concerns, they are likely to further dilute the 
incentives for innovation provided by conventional PVP systems. Continued reliance on public research 
institutions for variety development may have to remain an important element of their policy. Yet the 
provision of incentives for plant variety innovation for agricultural development is not an issue that they 
can ignore.  
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Appendix 
 
The names and location of the headquarters of the companies listed in Table 2 are given below. 
Group   Name  Country  Remarks 
Advanta  Advanta (AstraZeneca)  (Sweden and 
UK) 
  
Agrico  Agrico B.A.  (The 
Netherlands) 
  
Agri-Obtentions  Agri-Obtentions  (France)  Part of the Institut National de 
Recherche Agronomique (INRA) 
Aventis  Aventis  (Germany)  Hoechst + Rhoune Poulenc 
Barenbrug  Barenbrug Holdings B.V.  (The 
Netherlands) 
  
Benoist  Benoist C.C.  (France)    
Boehm  Boehm KG Kartoffelzucht  (Germany)    
Cebeco  Cebeco-Handelsraad  (The 
Netherlands) 
  
COOP de PAU  Coop de PAU (PAU 
Semences) 
(France)    
COOP-DE-ZPC  COOP-DE-ZPC  (The 
Netherlands) 
  
Delta and Pineland  Delta and Pineland Company  (U.S.A)    
Deutsche Saat  Deutsche Saatveredelung 
Lippstadt-Bremen GmbH  
(Germany)   
DLF  DLF-Trifolium  (Denmark)    
Dow  Dow Chemicals  (U.S.A)    
Dutch Institute  Dutch Institute of Plant 




GAE  Groupement Agricole 
Essonois 
(France)    
Germicopa  Germicopa  (France)    





KWS  KWS SAAT AG  (Germany)    
LB. Kartoffelfond  Landbrugets Kartoffelfond  (Denmark)    
Limagrain  Groupe Limagrain  (France)    
Maisadour  Maisadour Semences  (France)    





Monsanto  Monsanto Corporation  (U.S.A)   
Nidera   Nidera S.A.  (Argentina)    
Norddeutsche  Norddeutsche Pflanzenzucht 
Hans-Georg Lembke KG  
(Germany)    
Nordkartoffel  Nordkartoffel-
Zuchtgesellschaft 
(Germany)    
Norika  Nordring-Kartoffelzucht-und 
Vermehrungs GmbH 
(Germany)    
Novartis  Syngenta  (Switzerland)    
Pioneer  Pioneer Hi-Bred International (U.S.A)  Now owned by Du Pont (U.S.A) 
Pure Seed  Pure Seed Testing Inc.  (U.S.A)    
RAGT  RAGT Semences   (France)    
Saka Ragis  Saka Ragis Pflanzenzucht Gbr  (Germany)    
Serasem  Serasem  (France)    
Soybean Research 
Foundation 
Soybean Research Foundation  (U.S.A)  Industry supported research 
organisation 
Svalolf  Svaloef Weibull AB  (Sweden)    
Verneuil  Veerneuil Semences  (France)    
Wolf and Wolf  Wolf and Wolf B.V.  (The    e-JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS                                      Vol. 2, No. 2, 2005,  pp. 182-220 
 
   
Netherlands) 
Source: Details of PVP certificates and ownership from UPOV (2001). Details of subsidiaries, group 
affiliations, takeovers and acquisitions were obtained from a number of different sources including RAFI 
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